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COMPETITION & AWARD
¶ 10

ENHANCED DEBRIEFINGS: A Toothless Mandate?

Steven L. Schooner
Last month, Ralph described a “procurement to illustrate how frustrating the competitive negotiated procurement process
can be to a contractor that knows it is fully qualiﬁed to perform the contract work but loses the competition.” Postscript:
Frustrating Competitive Negotiation, 34 NCRNL ¶ 1, discussing IBM Corp., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-417664, 2019 CPD ¶ 327,
2019 WL 4688729. Competitive negotiation remains complicated, expensive, slow, frustrating to many of the parties involved,
and, all too often, serves as a common breeding ground for protests. Against that backdrop, Ralph seemed pleased to attribute
the reduction in Government Accountability Ofﬁce bid protest volume “to the renewed attention being paid to better
debrieﬁngs.” Protest Data From the Government Accountability Ofﬁce: Progress?, 33 NCRNL ¶ 72, citing the GAO’s Bid
Protest Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2019, B-158766 (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/
702551.pdf.
All of which failed to prepare us for (some of) the allegations in the (most recent) protest of the Department of Defense’s
Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) cloud computing program brought by disappointed offeror Amazon Web Services (AWS), now proceeding in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, raising issues largely unrelated to the prior GAO and
COFC protests previously brought by Oracle America, Inc. See 61 GC ¶ 340; Oracle America, Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec.
B-416657 et al., 2018 CPD ¶ 391, 61 GC ¶ 8; Oracle America, Inc. v. U.S., 144 Fed. Cl. 88 (2019), 61 GC ¶ 230. In addition
to complaints about the source selection strategy and conﬂicts of interest, Amazon complained about the manner in which the
DOD conducted Amazon’s postaward debrieﬁng:
Despite the signiﬁcance of the JEDI procurement—which had been years in the making and had a potential ceiling of $10 billion—on the same day DoD announced its award decision, DoD provided AWS a written debrieﬁng…and advised AWS that it had two
business days to submit written questions based on the debrieﬁng, foreclosing the opportunity for AWS to request and receive an inperson debrieﬁng.

***
DoD [then] failed to provide “reasonable responses to relevant questions about whether source selection procedures contained in the solicitation, applicable regulation, and other applicable authorities were followed.” See 48 C.F.R. § 15.506(d). In fact, DoD did not
provide a substantive response to a single one of the 265 questions that AWS timely submitted, leaving AWS in the dark about DoD’s
explanations for the substantive issues for which AWS raised concern in the debrieﬁng questions.
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See Complaint (redacted version) at 91–92, Amazon Web Services, Inc. v. U.S., No. 1:19-cv-01796-PEC (Fed. Cl. ﬁled Dec. 9,
2019) (emphasis added). While these are merely allegations, it sure sounds like the debrieﬁng following the DOD’s critically
important, high-value, high-proﬁle procurement isn’t destined to be a teaching model for “enhanced debrieﬁngs” at the
Defense Acquisition University.
The Debrieﬁng Mandate: A Paper Tiger
We don’t expect the quality of the DOD’s debrieﬁng to factor heavily in the JEDI procurement protest litigation. Had Amazon elected to bring its protest at the GAO, it might not even have bothered raising the debrieﬁng issue because it’s well
established that inadequate debrieﬁngs do not create a protestable issue at the GAO. Cibinic et al., FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS 992 (4th ed. 2011), citing, among others, Thermolten Tech., Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-278408, 98-1 CPD ¶ 35,
1998 WL 27114, 40 GC ¶ 211, where the GAO explained:
A protester’s challenge to the adequacy of a debrieﬁng is a procedural matter concerning agency actions after award which are unrelated to the validity of the award; we generally will not review such matters. C-Cubed Corp., B-272525, Oct. 21, 1996, 96-2 CPD ¶ 150
at 4 n.3.…While the debrieﬁng here may not have been what [the protester] expected, there is nothing to indicate that it was improper
or inadequate under the requirements of [FAR 15.506].

See also CACI Field Services, Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-234945, 89-2 CPD ¶ 97, 1989 WL 241567; Haworth, Inc., Comp.
Gen. Dec. B-215638.2, 84-2 CPD ¶ 461, 1984 WL 46838.
That might seem strange to the extent that the current Federal Acquisition Regulation has articulated the postaward debriefing mandate as, well, a mandate, since the implementation of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-355. See FAR 15.506(a)(1): “An offeror, upon its written request…shall be debriefed and furnished the basis for the selection decision and contract award.” (Emphasis added.) Contrast that with the discretionary nature of preaward debrieﬁngs
where the Contracting Ofﬁcer “may refuse the request for a debrieﬁng if, for compelling reasons, it is not in the best interests
of the Government to conduct a debrieﬁng at that time.” FAR 15.505(b) (although, of course, doing so entitles the offeror to, in
effect, a postaward debrieﬁng). Nor does anything on the GAO’s seemingly exhaustive list of “protest issues not for
consideration” discourage such a protest. 4 CFR § 21.5(a)–(m). Granted, debrieﬁng rights are not enumerated in the GAO’s
deﬁnition of “adverse agency action,” but nor are they obviously excluded. 4 CFR § 21.0(e). And it’s not like the GAO isn’t
fully cognizant of the debrieﬁng mandate, to the extent that it’s an integral part of the protest ﬁling timeliness calculation.
Indeed, the GAO concedes that their timeliness rules are constructed “to encourage offerors to seek, and agencies to give, early
and meaningful debrieﬁngs.” GAO, GAO-18-510SP, Bid Protests at GAO: A Descriptive Guide 10 (10th ed. May 2018), http
s://www.gao.gov/assets/700/691596.pdf.
Nonetheless, the GAO apparently doesn’t see debrieﬁngs as a legally signiﬁcant or relevant aspect of “a solicitation or other
request…for offers for a contract…; the cancellation of such a solicitation or other request; an award or proposed award of
such a contract; [or] a termination of such a contract,” so there is no right to complain of “improprieties” or failures with
regard to debrieﬁngs. 4 CFR § 21.1(a). And the GAO’s consistent, summary refusal to substantively engage on inadequate
debrieﬁngs can be traced back to the pre-FAR Defense Acquisition Regulation. See, e.g., Reliability Sciences, Inc., Comp.
Gen., B-212852, 84-1 CPD ¶ 493, 1984 WL 44181, where the GAO explained:
[W]e are not aware of any provision requiring the Navy to debrief [the protester] on the protest ﬁled here.…If the debrieﬁng was
requested on [the protester’s] proposal under Defense Acquisition Regulation § 3-508.4 (Defense Acquisition Circular No. 76-24,
August 28, 1980), the postponement of the debrieﬁng is merely a procedural matter which does not affect the validity of the award.

Nor has the GAO signaled any intention to change its position to accommodate the enhanced debrieﬁng mandate or various
agency initiatives offering more fulsome debrieﬁngs. See, e.g., Leader Communications, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-417152.2, 2019
CPD ¶ 241, 2019 WL 3001499 (“[O]ur Ofﬁce does not consider protests challenging an agency debrieﬁng. Healthcare Tech.
Solutions Int’l, B–299781, July 19, 2007, 2007 CPD ¶ 132 at 5 (…adequacy and conduct of debrieﬁng is a procedural matter
that does not involve the validity of contract award).”). This laissez-faire approach prevails even where an agency fails to
provide any debrieﬁng. CAMRIS International, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-417152.2, 2018 CPD ¶ 285, 2018 WL 3868955 (“Whether
an agency provides a debrieﬁng and the adequacy of a debrieﬁng are not issues that our Ofﬁce will consider, because the
scheduling and conduct of a debrieﬁng is a procedural matter that does not involve the validity of an award.”). But see Best
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Value Technology, Inc.—Costs, Comp. Gen. B-412624.3, 2017 CPD ¶ 50, 2017 WL 587027 (where the agency unduly
delayed taking corrective action after a meritorious protest, the GAO stated: “Although our Ofﬁce will not review a protester’s
contention that the debrieﬁng it received was inadequate, we note that the ﬂaw in the debrieﬁng appears emblematic of the
ﬂaws that plagued this procurement.” (Internal citations omitted.)).
To date, protest litigation involving enhanced debrieﬁng rights has been limited to the (formalistic and procedural rather
than substantive) time for ﬁling of a protest. See, e.g., State Women Corp., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-416510, 2018 CPD ¶ 240,
2018 WL 3414767 (after enhanced debrieﬁng procedures, the protest ﬁling period remains 10 (not 5) days); IACCESS
Technologies, Inc. v. U.S., 143 Fed. Cl. 521 (2019) (record unclear with regard to disappointed offeror’s failure to timely
request the debrieﬁng that the agency apparently had prepared).
The GAO has seen cases in which the agency provided a written debrieﬁng and then, later, provided an enhanced debriefing, Quantech Services, Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-417347, 2019 CPD ¶ 203, 2019 WL 2353606 (Air Force, Space and Missile
Systems Center); Tridentis LLC, Comp. Gen. Dec. B-417096, et al., 2019 CPD ¶ 91, 2019 WL 1035778 (Naval Surface
Warfare Center); the agency notiﬁed the offeror of the adverse award decision and provided the protester with both an initial
and enhanced debrieﬁng, all on the same day, Normandeau Associates, Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-417136, 2019 CPD ¶ 76,
2019 WL 581222 (Army Corps of Engineers); enhanced debrieﬁngs were followed by (uncontested) agency responses to additional questions, Technatomy Corp., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-414672.5, 2018 CPD ¶ 353, 2018 WL 5292575 ((DOD, Defense
Information Systems Agency); OGSystems, LLC, Comp. Gen. Dec. B-414672.6, et al., 2018 CPD ¶ 352, 2018 WL 5292576,
60 GC ¶ 354 (same); Solers, Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-414672.3, 2018 CPD ¶ 350, 2018 WL 5292572 (same); Novetta, Inc.,
Comp. Gen. Dec. B-414672.4, 2018 CPD ¶ 349, 2018 WL 5292574 (same); and at least one written (e.g., no oral component)
enhanced debrieﬁng, Oracle America, Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-417046, 2019 CPD ¶ 74, 2019 WL 581630 (also from DISA,
which the GAO did not appear to ﬁnd remarkable).
Although Amazon ﬁled at the COFC, there is no reason to expect a dramatically different approach. See RX Joint Venture,
LLC v. U.S., 145 Fed. Cl. 207 (2019) (preaward protest based on the offeror’s elimination from the competitive range), where
the CO notiﬁed the protester that “[a]ll offerors w[ould] receive a written debrief” but that “[t]here w[ould] be no in person or
oral debriefs scheduled.” Within two days of receiving a written debrief, the protester submitted a list of follow-up questions,
at which point the CO explained that “the Government will not [be] addressing the questions submitted” and that the “debrief
was concluded” on the date of the written debrief. None of this appeared to factor into the court’s decision. But see Trax
International Corp. v. U.S., 144 Fed. Cl. 417 (2019), in which the Army’s CO did respond to a series of questions following a
written debrieﬁng, and Mission1st Group, Inc. v. U.S., 144 Fed. Cl. 200 (2019), where the Army gave a “debrieﬁng presentation” and then responded to “several additional questions” from the disappointed offeror.
What Constitutes A Satisfactory Response?
It’s hard to imagine how the court could ﬁnd the DOD’s refusal to meet with Amazon face-to-face to be actionable. A written debrieﬁng could be both substantively and legally sufﬁcient. The statute mandates “a requirement for a written or oral
debrieﬁng,” which is consistent with FAR 15.506(b): “Debrieﬁngs of successful and unsuccessful offerors may be done orally,
in writing, or by any other method acceptable to the contracting ofﬁcer.” Sure, the FAR explains that “[t]he contracting ofﬁcer
should normally chair any debrieﬁng session held. Individuals who conducted the evaluations shall provide support.” FAR
15.506(c). But, again, that’s discretionary.
Failure to meaningfully respond to reasonable questions might prove more fruitful. In the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 818, Congress mandated that the DOD (1) allow the unsuccessful offeror to
pose at least one round of follow-up questions (within two business days of receipt of the initial debrieﬁng) and (2) respond
with written answers (within ﬁve business days). Accordingly, the court could decide—and provide guidance—as to whether
responses such as “we consider your questions unreasonable” or “no more information will be forthcoming” or “this form letter constitutes your congressionally mandated response to your questions” will sufﬁce. Sadly, Congress failed to anticipate the
need to clarify that written responses must be, well, responsive or informative. And the DOD’s minimalist class deviation
memo requires only that “unsuccessful offerors [shall have] an opportunity to submit additional questions related to the
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debrieﬁng … [and] the agency shall respond in writing.” DOD Class-Deviation 2018-O011, Enhanced Postaward Debrieﬁng
Rights (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA000563-18-DPAP.pdf (citing Pub. L. No. 11591, § 818(b) & (c) (amending 10 USCA § 2305(b)(5) and 31 USCA § 3553(d)(4))). Nor does the legislative history signal an
unambiguous expectation that questions will be followed by fulsome, meaningful responses:
The Senate amendment … would require the…[Defense FAR Supplement] to require that all mandatory post-award debrieﬁngs must
provide details and comprehensive statements of the agency’s rating for each evaluation criterion and of the agency’s overall award
decision. The revision would encourage the release of all information that would otherwise be releasable in the course of a bid protest
challenge to an award.…This provision would allow for the opportunity for follow-up questions for a disappointed offeror within two
business days of receiving a post-award debrieﬁng to be answered in writing by the agency within ﬁve business days.

H.R. Rep. No. 115-404, 870 (Nov. 9, 2017) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added).
All that the statute requires is a response, and neither the FAR 15.506(d)(6) mandate nor the term “reasonable responses” is
new. In other words, there’s nothing in the recent legislation that might prompt the court to consider how little substance a
procuring agency can provide when a disappointed offer asks a question (or scores of questions).
A Squandered Opportunity
This suggests that the enhanced debrieﬁng legislation represents a squandered opportunity. We think debrieﬁngs make
sense, but only if they are informative or, more to the point, responsive. Formalistic debrieﬁngs serve no purpose, waste
Government resources, and frustrate (and potentially enrage) private sector offerors that invested valuable resources preparing
lengthy proposals. And, yes, we remain deeply skeptical of expensive, time-consuming essay-writing proposal contests. See,
inter alia, Postscript III: Page Limitations, 34 NCRNL ¶ 2; Essay-Writing Contests: How Did We Get Here?, 30 NCRNL ¶
47; Technical Approach Deﬁciencies and Signiﬁcant Weaknesses: Must They Be Discussed?, 27 N&CR ¶ 30; The EssayWriting Contest: An Extreme Example, 21 N&CR ¶ 46; Best Value Procurement: A Flawed Process?, 20 N&CR ¶ 34;
Postscript III: The Technical Proposal, 12 N&CR ¶ 45; The Technical Proposal: Is It Fish or Fowl?, 11 N&CR ¶ 22.
We favor meaningful, informative debrieﬁngs, both from a transparency and a good business perspective, despite the
Government anxiety they induce. To start, the FAR 1.102 “guiding principles” discuss “maintaining the public’s trust” and
(somewhat awkwardly) assert that “[t]he Federal Acquisition System will…[c]onduct business with integrity, fairness, and
openness.” In Debrieﬁng: Tell It Like It Is, 4 N&CR ¶ 43, John Cibinic conceded that many Government ofﬁcials perceive
debrieﬁngs “to be one of the most difﬁcult and distasteful tasks in the entire procurement process. It seems to instill fear and
loathing in procurement personnel far out of proportion to the demands of the assignment.…[But] there are a number of
beneﬁts which can be achieved from a properly handled debrieﬁng.” See also Preaward Debrieﬁngs: Get Them Done Quickly,
12 N&CR ¶ 22; Protests and Debrieﬁngs: A Tangled Web, 11 N&CR ¶ 47; Debrieﬁng: Congress Has Now Spoken, 9 N&CR
¶ 3 (noting that in 4 N&CR ¶ 43, John “predicted that if the Government procuring agencies did not provide more adequate
debrieﬁngs, Congress would get into the act. They didn’t and it has.”).
The consensus that supports more fulsome disclosure is neither new nor without substantive justiﬁcation. Recall the ﬁrst
recommendation from the 2018 RAND Bid Protest report:
A major concern from the private sector is the quality of post-award debrieﬁngs. The consensus among companies is that the quality
and number of post-award debrieﬁngs vary signiﬁcantly. The worst debrieﬁngs were characterized as being skimpy, adversarial, and
evasive or as failing to provide required reasonable responses to relevant questions. In desperation, unsuccessful offerors may submit a
bid protest to obtain government documents that delineate the rationale for the contract award.… [I]n most cases, too little information
and evasive/adversarial debrieﬁngs will lead to a bid protest.
Our recommendation is to consider having DoD adopt a debrieﬁng process similar to the U.S. Air Force’s extended brieﬁng process.

Arena et al., RAND, Assessing Bid Protests of U.S. Department of Defense Procurements: Identifying Issues, Trends, and
Drivers 65 (Dec. 2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2356.html. See Postscript: The RAND Study of DOD
Protests, 32 NCRNL ¶ 13; Bid Protests: The RAND Study of DOD Protests at the GAO and the COFC, 32 NCRNL ¶ 10;
Berger, Feature Comment: Developments Affecting DOD Bid Protests, 61 GC ¶ 113 (Apr. 17, 2019) (“With new debrieﬁng
procedures…, DOD may be leading the way toward better debrieﬁngs Government-wide.…Unsuccessful offerors on contracts
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with the DOD can use the newly adopted procedures to obtain valuable and necessary information to help them better
understand the agency’s reasoning and decision, why they lost the competition and how they can improve their proposals, and
whether there is a valid basis for a bid protest.”)
Reaching back more than generation, see Recommendation 5 (Post-Award Policy) from the Report of the Commission on
Government Procurement, Vol. 1 at 25 (1972): “When competitive procedures [other than formal advertising, or, today, sealed
bid] are utilized,… agencies shall, upon request of an unsuccessful proposer, effectively communicate the reasons for selecting
a proposal other than his own.” More recently, the American Bar Association Section of Public Contract Law reminded the
Section 809 Panel that:
As part of the Commission’s afﬁrmative plan to reduce the number of protests, the Report recommended improved debrieﬁng procedures
based on an unpublished Department of the Air Force study from 1971 indicating that a certain portion of award protests were made unnecessarily because they were “based on incomplete or erroneous information concerning the rationale for making the administrative
decisions on which those protests are based” and “[o]ften, after full information is available, the protests are withdrawn.”

ABA Public Contract Law Section, Comments to Section 809 Panel; Proposed Changes to Procurement System and Bid
Protests; Overall Comments 8 n.25(May 11, 2018). See ABA Section Criticizes 809 Panel’s Proposals To Limit Bid Protests,
60 GC ¶ 167. The Ofﬁce of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) has pounded the same drum. See Memorandum from Lesley
A. Field, Acting Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, to Chief Acquisition Ofﬁcers et al., “Myth-Busting 3”: Further Improving Industry Communication With Effective Debrieﬁngs (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.ago.noaa.gov/acquisition/doc
s/ofpp_myth_busting_3.pdf, stating: “Despite the numerous beneﬁts associated with an effective debrieﬁng, a number of
misconceptions may be discouraging some agencies from taking full advantage of this tool.” The OFPP’s memo highlighted
steps taken and guidance shared by the Department of Homeland Security, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, DOD, and the Department of the Treasury. The memo speciﬁcally addressed the two key practices raised in the JEDI
protest. OFPP disagreed with Misconception 8, that: “All debrieﬁngs should be completed in writing.”
Fact: … [B]oth agencies and industry have expressed a preference for in-person debrieﬁngs. In-person debrieﬁngs allow for an open,
ﬂexible space where the government and offeror are able to communicate in a productive manner and foster a positive rapport.…
Best Practice: NASA, DHS, and Treasury debrieﬁng guides, as well as DOD policy, encourage in person debrieﬁngs whenever
practicable….

The OFPP also took issue with Misconception 6, that “the government should avoid engaging in further discussions or
follow-up questions during the debrief.”
Fact: The debrieﬁng is meant to provide a thorough explanation of the basis for the award….and reasonable responses to relevant
questions.

***
[S]uccessful debrieﬁngs instill conﬁdence in the unsuccessful offerors that the government treated all offerors fairly and assure them
that the government evaluated all proposals in accordance with the solicitation and applicable laws and regulations.

See also Cibinic et al., FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, 985, 992 (4th ed. 2011) (noting that debrieﬁngs serve a number
of functions, including providing offerors with information to challenge the selection and “an indication of how those offerors
can improve their chances for success in future procurements”).
A Good Debrieﬁng Is Better Than A Lousy Protest
Both debrieﬁngs and protests are a common tools for increasing transparency into the procurement process. See Acquisition
Reform: A Progress Report, 16 N&CR ¶ 48, noting: “Transparency embodies the idea that if you shine the light of day on
agency practices, agencies’ violations of rules or their dumb procurement practices will be hung out for everyone to see and try
to eliminate.…At present, protests are the principal means of achieving transparency.” In that discussion, Vern suggested that,
among other things, that “the basis for all awards should also be published on the Internet and made available to the public,
including the number of sources sought and the reasons for selecting the source. Such information would already have been
documented in the agency ﬁles and would not require a signiﬁcant amount of effort.” That makes sense to me, because
transparency makes oversight more effective and far less burdensome. See, e.g., Oversight of Procurements: Is It Adequate?,
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15 N&CR ¶ 64; Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Government, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 627,
650 n.77 (2001), which explained one of (few?) bright spots from the FAR Part 15 rewrite:
The most frequently identiﬁed government purchasing practice that may have led to a decrease in protest activity is the debrieﬁng process, the requirements for which were upgraded during [OFPP administrator] Kelman’s tenure. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 15.505, 15.506.…
The revised regulations appear to have resulted in agencies providing more useful information to disappointed offerors on a more expeditious basis. Conventional wisdom suggests that quality debrieﬁngs reduce contractors’ incentive to ﬁle exploratory protests.

Conclusion: Wrong-Headed Form Over Substance
The DOD’s debrieﬁng gambit provides a strange coda to an ongoing procurement saga in which two major competitors independently alleged dramatic, facially compelling conﬂicts of interest. See, e.g., Developments: DOD Awards JEDI Cloud
Contract to Microsoft, Bypassing Amazon, Oracle, 61 GC ¶ 324(d) ; New Defense Secretary To Review JEDI Procurement, 61
GC ¶ 232; Oracle Was Not Prejudiced by Alleged Errors in JEDI Procurement, COFC Holds, 61 GC ¶ 230; Oracle America,
Inc. v. U.S., 144 Fed. Cl. 88 (2019), 61 GC ¶ 230 (currently on appeal, 61 GC ¶ 268(f) ), Hiring a Member of the Source
Selection Team: Not a Recommended Practice, 33 NCRNL ¶ 54 (don’t hire a member of the Government source selection
team in the middle of a competition); Comp. Gen. Denies Oracle Protest of Single-Award Approach for JEDI Cloud IDIQ, 61
GC ¶ 8; Oracle America, Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-416657 et al., 2018 CPD ¶ 391, 2018 WL 6040648, 61 GC ¶ 8.
We doubt that the DOD chose this procurement to afﬁrmatively push back against the enhanced debrieﬁng trend; rather, the
DOD likely chose a minimalist approach fearing that anything the debrieﬁng disclosed would be used in Amazon’s inevitable
protest. Time will tell whether Amazon’s counsel chose well in proceeding at the COFC instead of the GAO. The DOD was
probably correct in assuming there was minimal risk that its behavior would generate adverse precedent, even assuming Amazon’s allegations are proven. The court is unlikely to seize this opportunity to more clearly deﬁne the minimum standards for
what the Government must disclose, and how it should behave, in an enhanced debrieﬁng.
Conversely, the DOD’s (alleged) actions send a disappointing and dispiriting message with regard to (substantive rather
than formalistic) compliance with the FAR, deference to congressional mandates, and respect for the Government’s potential
private sector partners and their investment of resources in the source selection process. That’s a shame. SLS
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